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Introduction
Traditionally, much of the literature on state corporate taxation has focused on how taxes affect the location of economic activity (see Wasylenko, 1997) . A perpetual concern among policymakers is that higher tax rates or broader tax bases will retard regional economic development. In contrast, some recent research has begun to focus more on tax planning, or how firms expand after-tax profits by adjusting to tax policy through financial arrangements within related firms. Interest in tax planning among businesses is evidenced by the fact that each of the Big Four accounting firms and many banks maintain specific groups to deal exclusively with aiding firms in making arrangements to reduce their tax liability.
Tax planning is defined here as a broad set of tax avoidance and evasion schemes that affect only financial arrangements of firms. Tax planning is contrasted with strategies in which firms move physical operations to avoid higher taxes -herein termed locational distortions of tax policy. 1 Firms may also respond to corporate taxation by altering the input mix or production technology, though no attempt is made here to measure the implications of this third effect. Tax planning exploits differences in state tax policies and often involves sophisticated arrangements wherein firms create one or more subsidiaries for the purpose of shifting income from high to lower tax jurisdictions.
Tax planning strategies are often legal, but some may fall into a legally gray area or even be blatantly illegal methods of tax evasion such as underreporting taxable income or overstating tax deductions. 2 Policymakers' uneasiness surrounding increases in the use of tax planning techniques is grounded in these techniques' potential contribution to the decline of state corporate income tax bases. State corporate income tax revenues as a share of corporate profits fell by about one-third from 1989 to 2002 (controlling for rate changes), and some have asserted that tax planning is a significant contributor to this decline (Fox and Luna, 2002) . 3 Policymakers' concerns are evidenced by the fact that, since 2002, as many as 18
states have considered adding or modifying a combined reporting requirement with the intention of retarding tax planning activities (Houghton, Hogroian, and Weinreb, 2004) .
Other potential problems include lost neutrality when only a subset of firms is able to use tax planning to minimize taxes and increases in compliance and administrative costs associated with implementing tax planning practices.
If one is only concerned with the revenue consequences of tax planning, then the growing literature on the elasticity of taxable income is perhaps most relevant. 4 Specifically, locational distortions, tax planning, and other responses potentially change a state's corporate income tax base, so an analysis of the overall elasticity of reported taxable corporate income would give policy makers a good picture of the combined problem from a revenue perspective. However, the purpose of this paper is to isolate tax planning effects from locational distortions in a broader consideration of economic 2 An aggregation of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and ambiguous practices differs from traditional analysis but is consistent with recent research. See Slemrod (2004) who refers to these actions as "tax selfishness." One advantage of this aggregation is the ability to avoid categorizing legally ambiguous practices along the gray area between evasion and avoidance. 3 Other likely determinants of the tax base erosion are reductions in the federal corporate income tax base (to which essentially every state CIT base is coupled) and state policy decisions such as concessions for economic development purposes. 4 See Slemrod (1998) and Slemrod (2001) for a general discussion.
efficiency. The extent to which tax planning might be substituting for locational effects is important, even though the combined revenue effects might be slight.
Unfortunately, the efficiency consequences of tax planning alone cannot be determined a priori. For example, prior to the adoption of tax planning strategies, firms might have moved real activity in response to tax policy, creating an inefficient allocation of resources. Tax planning strategies might allow firms to respond to tax policy through structural changes within the firm, removing the inefficiency from repositioning operations. Even if tax planning and locational distortions have identical effects on reported taxable income (and revenues), greater tax planning and correspondingly less locational distortions might have a net positive effect on overall economic efficiency.
Some also would assert that tax planning could be efficiency-enhancing when viewed within a Leviathan framework (i.e., it helps to constrain a government that is too large). On the other hand, tax planning may retard efficiency if it ignites a "race to the bottom" that yields tax rates on mobile capital below an efficient level, resulting in an economy that is too capital intensive (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1996) . Further, overall efficiency changes depend on other factors such as administrative and compliance costs (which could potentially be very large) and, in a revenue neutral framework, on the alternative revenue sources used to replace declining corporate tax revenues.
The degree to which tax planning has eroded state tax bases is yet to be empirically tested with a significant degree of rigor. It remains to be seen whether accounts of tax planning are anecdotal and isolated or whether tax planning has significantly reduced tax revenues. Indeed, as evidenced by the Associated Industries of
Massachusetts (2004), a consensus regarding the extent of tax planning is elusive. Fully informed tax policy decision-making requires a greater understanding of the causes, effects and extent of tax planning.
The purpose of this essay is to determine the extent to which tax planning in response to tax policy differences across U.S. states has lowered state corporate income tax revenues. This effect cannot be measured directly but will be accomplished indirectly by examining relationships between several state tax policy parameters and state corporate income tax bases. More specifically, evidence of the impact of tax planning can be inferred from an econometric model that examines the effects of tax structure variables on the corporate income tax base while holding state economic activity constant. This study also assesses the degree to which the effect of such activities on corporate income tax bases has changed over time. Further, the analysis allows us to examine whether the effectiveness of state efforts to restore corporate income tax bases (i.e., combined reporting requirements and throwback rules) are effective.
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 presents a more in-depth discussion of several tax planning strategies. Section 4 details the empirical strategy and the data that are used. Section 5 presents a discussion of the results, and Section 6 offers a conclusion. Results indicate that tax planning in response to state tax policy differences significantly diminishes state corporate income tax bases in higher tax states. In addition, the evidence suggests that combined reporting requirements are frequently effective in partially restoring state corporate income tax bases while throwback rules are not. Results do not indicate that tax planning has diminished the location distortions of tax policy between 1985 and 2001.
Existing Literature
No studies have been identified that specifically measure the extent to which tax planning has eroded state tax bases. Fox and Luna (2002) review state corporate income tax revenue trends and assert that tax planning is a contributor to the decline of state corporate bases. They also discuss some of the methods that are intended to restore corporate income tax base erosion due to tax planning (some of which are discussed below). However, they do not specifically measure the effect of tax planning on state tax bases.
5 Mintz and Smart (2004) investigate the extent to which income shifting among affiliated companies (which constitutes one form of tax planning) affects provincial tax bases in Canada. They develop a theoretical model that finds that taxable income for multijurisdictional firms is more mobile for firms that are able to shift income between affiliated companies than for those that are not. Their model also predicts that the responsiveness of real investment to tax rate differentials is reduced by the possibility of income shifting. Then, using administrative tax records for businesses operating in Canadian provinces, they test their hypothesis by estimating and comparing taxable income elasticities between firms that are able to engage in income shifting to firms that are not, and indeed find that the elasticity of taxable income is much higher for firms that are able to shift income.
Two other areas of literature are relevant here. The first is literature on the effects of tax policy on location, or how tax policy affects the location of the physical operations of firms. This large literature represents, in large part, the traditional treatment of the effects of tax policy on business. This literature is important to this study because, (1) as previously stated, it may be possible that tax planning has reduced location distortions and (2) the methods below provide further information as to the effects of tax policy on the location of economic activity. The literature on federal tax planning, which has likely grown significantly over the past decade or so, is also relevant 6 since nearly every state begins its determination of profits with the federal definition. In addition, the degree to which firms pursue tax planning at the federal level may be a signal of the intensity of planning at the state level.
Location Effects of Tax Policy.
The literature on the effects of tax policy on the location of economic activity is vast, in part due to the great emphasis policymakers place on structuring tax policy to be conducive to economic development. Fortunately, Wasylenko (1997) Bartik (1991 and 1994 Rego (2003) finds that economies of scale exist in tax planning, i.e., larger and more profitable multinational firms are better able to reduce their income tax liability through tax planning.
A highly publicized form of tax planning at the federal level involves corporate inversions, or when a corporation with a foreign subsidiary (usually in a low or no tax country) inverts its structure such that the foreign subsidiary becomes the parent company and the U.S. firm becomes the subsidiary. This tactic generally allows the corporation to reduce its tax liability on its foreign income and also to hold pre-tax profits until earnings are repatriated to the U.S. Desai and Hines (2002) analyze the determinants of inversions and find that firms are more likely to invert if they are larger and more heavily leveraged and if they have more overseas assets and operate in low-tax foreign countries. Gentry and Hubbard (1998, p.193 ) discuss three general forms of tax planning under the current federal corporate income tax: "discouraging incorporation, encouraging borrowing, and altering the timing of transactions." They analyze how fundamental tax reform in the form of either (1) integrating the personal and corporate systems or (2) moving from the current income tax to a pure consumption tax would alleviate these tax planning incentives. They conclude that both types of reforms can significantly reduce the incentives to adopt these forms of tax planning. Many firms have altered the characterization of business and non-business income to reduce tax liability. The distinction is important because only business income is apportionable while non-business income is allocated to the state in which it was earned.
Therefore, a firm can reduce its tax liability by classifying some income as non-business income where possible and shifting it to a low or no-tax state.
Congress passed P.L. 86-272 as a temporary measure to limit state efforts to tax multistate corporations while the best means of taxing the firms was being studied. The temporary legislation remains in place decades later. P.L. 86-272 precludes a state from levying tax on a firm whose only linkage with the state is the solicitation of sales of tangible personal property. Thus, companies can avoid tax through the creation of "nowhere income" when they sell into states where they have no presence other than solicitation, since the destination state cannot attribute the sales for corporate tax purposes and the origin state generally does not attribute the sales for corporate tax purposes.
Manipulating transfer prices is a common type of tax planning. For example, consider a firm that is headquartered in Delaware and has two wholly owned subsidiaries, a retailer in Montana and a wholesaler in Wyoming. An increase in the price that the Wyoming firm charges the Montana firm shifts profits from Montana to Wyoming. This transaction will lower overall tax liability as long as Wyoming's tax rate is lower than Montana's (Wyoming does not impose a corporate income tax), and Montana does not impose a combined reporting requirement (see below).
The fourth group of tax planning practices involves the creation of a passive investment company (PIC). This strategy often exploits the tax structure of either Fox, Luna, and Murray, 2005) . Indeed, throwback rules are a form of origin-based taxation and give firms an incentive to locate sales in states that do not impose such rules.
Empirical Design and Data
The primary hypothesis in this study is that cross-state differences in corporate tax policies have led to tax planning that has significantly lowered state corporate income tax bases. The effect of tax planning on tax bases cannot be measured directly but can be tested in the following way. A state's total CIT base is determined by three factors: (1) a set of state-determined institutional parameters that define taxable income, (2) the magnitude of economic activity in the state that is taxed under the CIT structure, and (3) the ability of firms to make financial or accounting adjustments to lower their tax liability. The third determinant of the CIT base is tax planning -the myriad ways in 16 See Tax Management Multistate Tax Report (2004) for a discussion.
14 which firms adjust and restructure to lower tax liabilities. Tax planning to reduce taxable profits may be spurred by any tax policy change that raises the effective tax rate that firms face, by differences in tax structures between states, or by changes in state law that make planning easier.
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State tax policy can affect firm behavior along a number of different margins, some of which entail tax planning responses and others of which change real behavior.
We seek to separate these two types of responses by estimating the regression model that explains state CIT bases as a function of the set of government parameters that define the CIT base, Gross State Product (GSP) and variables that change the effective tax rate that firms face. GSP is included in the model to account for the effect that tax structures have on tax bases through changes in the real behavior of firms, with the goal being to isolate the effects of tax planning by separating out real effects.
Firms can make two real economic responses to the higher relative price of capital caused by an increase in the effective corporate tax rate. They can relocate production to lower-cost-of-capital states, or they can change the capital/labor ratio (either within the existing technology or by using a new technology) used within the taxing state. Changes in the location of production are accounted for through GSP and are isolated from tax planning. Changes in the capital/labor ratio are accounted for through GSP to the extent that firms reduce output as they alter relative input use. That said, substitution of labor for capital will presumably also reduce firms' before-tax profits, and this will get reflected in a lower CIT base. Tax planning or real economic effects could be encouraged by any parameter that affects the overall tax burden firms face, not just parameters directly related to the corporate income tax. The state general sales tax rate is included because it represents the largest component of the overall state tax liability of many firms since it is imposed on the sales value of many business-to-business transactions (Cline et al., 2003a and 2003b; Cline et al., 2005) . In a similar fashion, the top marginal personal income tax (PIT) rate is included. Firms may be more likely to incorporate when faced with higher 21 This procedure uses a random effects regression that results in an overall R-squared of 0.72. The federal corporate income tax base coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. Results are omitted for brevity but are available upon request. 22 Our use of the top statutory CIT rate might raise concerns about measurement error if one truly believes that the firm's effective tax rate is a more appropriate measure. However, our analysis of aggregate state data rather than individual firm data makes the use of effective tax rates less compelling. Also, we view the statutory rate as an important policy signal at the aggregate level and have thus elected to include it along with most other factors in effective tax rate calculations (e.g., combined reporting and throwback rules, apportionment formula details, and other features of state CIT structures).
PIT rates relative to CIT rates or closely held corporations may choose to pay less in wages to owner/operators, meaning higher PIT rates could raise the CIT base.
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Corporate Tax Structure. Elements of the corporate tax structure could influence GSP and also have independent effects on CIT bases. The former is true because many of these parameters raise or lower effective corporate tax rates, which may create location distortions. The independent effects on CIT bases may occur because these variables help define the CIT base.
The first variable included in this group is the sales factor weight in the state corporate income tax apportionment formula. The apportionment formula uses a state's share of the corporation's national property, plant, and payroll to distribute the corporation's national profits to the state for tax purposes. These three factors are added together using weights that the states have been varying as economic development tools.
Increasing the sales factor weight, which may entice firms (especially manufacturing firms) to expand production in a given state, has become a commonly-used instrument for attracting production.
In general, for given tax rates, locating payroll and property in a state with a high sales factor weight while selling in many states will reduce tax liability compared with locating the payroll and property in a state with a low sales factor weight and higher weights on property and payroll factors (see Edmiston, 2002 Fox and Luna, 2005) . The option for LLC status could affect economic activity because firms may start in or relocate to states to exploit this organizational form. The LLC structure can be preferred over the C-corporation structure because LLCs also offer limited liability, but in many cases they are treated as pass-through entities with the income taxed only under the PIT system. 27 Further, LLCs are often exempt from some other corporate taxes, such as the corporate license taxes in Louisiana. This arrangement allows these firms to avoid double taxation of the CIT and PIT systems, reducing CIT bases. In addition, singlemember LLCs can erode CIT bases through the tax planning opportunities described above. This variable is specified as a dummy to denote whether states permit LLCs.
Allowing corporations to deduct their federal CIT liability will directly lower state CIT bases. We include a dummy variable to denote a federal CIT liability deduction from the state CIT. This variable essentially lowers the effective CIT rate that firms face in a state and, thus, may generate locational distortions. Economic development incentive programs are inherently difficult to capture in a simple metric because of the wide variation in incentive programs offered across states. They are incorporated in this analysis via a count of the number of incentive programs that states offer. The counts are 26 It should be noted that we include two of the most common and most visible policies that have been used to offset the effects of tax planning but this does not represent a comprehensive set of such variables.
States use several other policies, some of which were discussed in Section 3, to lessen avoidance opportunities. However, reliable data on these policies for all states and for the time period of this analysis are difficult to obtain. We leave this to future work. 27 The LLC structure also offers some advantages over S-corporations. For example, there is no limit on the number of members of an LLC whereas an S corporation is limited to 100 shareholders (75 before 2005).
divided into the number of tax incentive programs and the number of non-tax incentive programs. Both of these counts may increase economic activity by attracting firms to a state. Tax incentive programs should lower the CIT base because states are providing tax breaks through these programs. Non-tax incentive programs may increase real economic activity as they lower business costs, although no independent effect on the tax base is expected.
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The primary stage of the regression model is summarized below: where i and t are state and year indices. 29 To be precise, under perfect information the CIT base does not affect GSP directly, rather it is the parameters that define the base that affect GSP. However, given the complexity of CIT structures, firms may not separately consider every parameter that defines the CIT base and, under these circumstances, respond directly to the CIT base. A standard Hausman test revealed that GSP is endogenous in the CIT base equation (Hausman, 1978) . 30 See, for example, Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) .
Instruments for GSP. As previously mentioned, GSP is
demand, costs of producing in a particular location, and, of course, taxes. Two measures of input costs are included. The first is the average hourly wage for manufacturing workers in a state. The second is a measure of overall energy prices in a state (including all forms of energy such as gas, electricity, etc.). State population and median income are included to control for state size and demand. Population density is included because a high population concentration may influence the ability of firms to achieve economies of operation. Total state government expenditures per capita control for government size. Government size has an ambiguous theoretical effect; firms may be more likely to locate in a state with greater expenditures per capita recognizing the associated benefits of more public services. Alternatively, they could focus on the higher taxes accompanying larger governments and choose to locate elsewhere to the extent that per capita taxes and expenditures are correlated. The percentage of a state's residents (over age 25) who hold a baccalaureate degree or higher would likely influence GSP because many firms require an educated workforce.
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All regressions include state-and year-specific fixed effects to control for state and time specific factors not included in the model. 32 CIT bases and GSP are entered as natural logs to control for the scaling effects from the wide variation in GSP and CIT bases between large and small states. The time period of analysis, 1985 through 2001, is advantageous in that it began just before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which potentially affected tax planning by reducing marginal federal corporate income tax rates, thereby increasing the relative value of avoiding state business taxes from the perspective of firms. This time span also allows for broad changes across the business cycle. Appendix 1 presents summary statistics for all variables for the first and last years of the study and Appendix 2 provides variable descriptions and source notes.
Results and Discussion
This section first discusses the results from the baseline model. It then turns to a modified baseline model that includes the CIT rate interacted with other CIT structural parameters to more precisely identify the effects of these parameters. The section closes with another modification of the baseline model that considers the possibility that tax planning has replaced the location distortions of tax policy over time.
Baseline Model.
GSP Results. Table 1 presents results from the primary regression model.
Estimates from the first stage equation indicate that the top CIT rate does not have a statistically identifiable effect on private sector economic activity. However, increases in 32 Note that this will influence our interpretation of the regression results, as statistical significance will be identified on the basis of changes in variables over time as well as cross-state differences. We also estimated the model using a random effects specification, but a Hausman (1978) test revealed correlations between the explanatory variables and the random effects.
top PIT rates and sales tax rates are associated with lower levels of output growth. One possible explanation is that the sales tax and PIT each account for about one-third of state tax revenues (and large shares of business costs) while the corporate income tax currently generates only about six percent of state tax revenue. The magnitude of the PIT rate effect is relatively small: a one-percentage-point increase in the top PIT rate decreases GSP by only 0.6 percent. In contrast, a one-percentage-point increase in the sales tax rate lowers GSP by 3.6 percent.
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The sales factor weight in the state CIT apportionment formula is also a statistically significant determinant of GSP. The model predicts that a sales factor weight increase from 33 percent to 50 percent would increase GSP by 1.7 percent. Deductibility of federal CIT liability from state CITs tends to reduce GSP growth, though the estimated effects are larger than seems reasonable. As variation in this factor is limited to a very small number of states, it may be picking up other influences common to those states. In addition, the number of non-tax incentive programs has a statistically distinguishable, but unexpected negative, relationship with GSP. The programs may offer lower benefits than the tax costs, so the net effect is a reduction of economic activity. Alternatively, this variable could be endogenous with gross output if more non-tax incentive programs are developed in low output states.
Some of the other control variables in the first stage of the model also deserve attention. As would be expected, states with higher population or median income growth relative to the national average have higher relative GSP growth. Interestingly, increases in state government expenditures per capita tend to yield lower GSP growth. The overall relationship between government spending and total output is not captured because the GSP measure excludes government spending; this result could simply reflect the crowding out of private output. States with higher growth in average wages for manufacturing workers have higher rates of growth in economic output. This likely suggests that more skilled workers, as evidenced by greater salaries, result in greater output. In addition, increases in a state's highly educated population are associated with higher GSP growth.
Corporate Income Tax Base Results.
Results from the second stage of the model indicate that GSP is highly significant in explaining the CIT base with an estimated elasticity of 0.60. The lack of statistical significance on the constant term in this equation, combined with the significance of GSP, indicate that the CIT base fundamentally follows from GSP, as would be expected.
A one-percentage-point increase in the top CIT rate is associated with a 6.6 percent decrease in the corporate income tax base, holding GSP and all else in the model constant. 34 The relationship between the CIT rate and base is mostly attributable to tax planning activities because holding GSP constant eliminates the effect of location distortions on the base. However, effects on profitability arising from changes in the relative use of inputs can also be included in this coefficient. Further, the CIT base declines by 1.5 percent following a one-percentage-point increase in the PIT rate, again attributable to tax planning. As previously stated, when faced with higher tax rates in the PIT system, owners may be cost-justified in seeking more tax planning opportunities.
Several other tax variables are statistically significant in explaining the CIT base.
Higher sales factor weights relative to the national average are associated with higher relative CIT base growth. Changing the apportionment formula does not create any additional tax base across the 50 states, but differences in state apportionment formulas appear to allow those states with higher sales ratios to tax a greater share of the corporate tax base. The model provides no evidence that state efforts to limit tax planning are effective. The imposition of combined reporting requirements or throwback rules has no effect on CIT bases in this context. These policies receive more attention in the next section.
The model also fails to find evidence that allowing LLCs erodes the CIT base. Fox and Luna (2005) use a different CIT base measure and find that advent of LLCs lowered tax revenues, but only when the analysis is run without fixed effects for time.
The result found here might also be due to a high degree of correlation between the LLC dummy and the year fixed effects. As expected, allowing the deduction of federal CIT liability reduces state CIT base growth. In addition, more tax incentive programs reduce growth in the CIT base. More non-tax incentive programs are associated with higher CIT base growth, holding GSP constant. Perhaps firms pursue tax planning strategies less aggressively when offered more non-tax incentive programs, thereby increasing the tax base.
We also present a set of results from a standard fixed effects model that does not control for the possible endogeneity bias. Here our tax policy results are largely similar to those in the instrumental variables specification, indicating that any endogeneity bias is small. Nonetheless, since a Hausman test revealed GSP endogeneity, we will continue to focus on the two-stage results.
Several pieces of policy-relevant information can be drawn from these results.
Sales and personal income tax rates have statistically significant and negative effects on economic activity in states, although the effect of the personal income tax is small. On the other hand, the corporate income tax rate does not have a significant effect on economic activity. Higher corporate income tax rates do appear to encourage tax planning, so policymakers should be aware of the large tax-planning-related base erosion that would likely follow an increase in corporate income tax rates.
Baseline Model Modified to Include CIT Rate Interactions. Table 2 presents a set of results similar to those in Table 1 with the difference being the inclusion of (1) interactions of the top CIT rate with the sales factor weight in the CIT apportionment formula, combined reporting requirements, throwback rules, and LLC allowances and (2) the CIT apportionment formula, combined reporting, and throwback rule variables interacted with each other in each possible two-way combination. This specification allows for a more in-depth examination of the effects of these variables because it more precisely identifies how the effect of each element of CIT structure differs across policy regimes defined by the other CIT factors. This framework is especially important given that it is likely that many firms consider state tax structures from a broad perspective (i.e., rates and other policies in conjunction) rather than from a narrower perspective that only considers each element of the tax structure in isolation.
We focus our discussion of Table 2 on the CIT base results, leaving a more detailed analysis of the GSP results to the reader.
Our first result of note in Table 2 is that we find no separate effect of the CIT rate on tax planning. Instead, the CIT rate only reduces the base in states that impose a throwback rule. More specifically, the CIT base falls by 7.1 percent for every onepercentage-point increase in the top CIT rate. Combined reporting requirements are effective in increasing CIT bases, but the effect depends on whether a throwback rule is also imposed. The CIT base increase from a combined reporting requirement is large in states without a throwback rule but falls considerably in states with throwback rules.
This suggests that the throwback rule may have reaped some of the gains that could be obtained with combined reporting. Increases in the sales factor weight only increase the CIT base in states that also impose a throwback rule. This is expected since the "throwing back" of sales into a state will have a greater impact in the formula when a greater weight is applied to sales. Results do not identify a significant relationship between LLC allowances and the CIT base.
One policy implication is that combined reporting requirements aid in restoring corporate income tax bases in most cases without diminishing economic activity.
Alternatively, results indicate that throwback rules often have the perverse effect of actually diminishing CIT bases.
Tax Planning Over Time.
In the third and final component of our study, we examine whether tax planning has increased over time and whether tax planning has replaced locational distortions. We use two approaches to investigate this. First, we run the baseline model while fully interacting the top CIT rate with the year fixed effects. Second, we estimate a model in which the year fixed effects are replaced with a time trend in both level and interaction terms. 35 Results from the latter model are presented in Table 3 , while similar yet more cumbersome results from the former model are omitted for brevity.
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The first goal is to understand how effects of the tax rate on the tax base differ over time, holding GSP constant. The results from these models do not identify a significant difference in the effect of the CIT rate on the CIT base over time, providing evidence that tax planning was equally prevalent throughout the period of analysis. The only difference between the specification with year fixed effects and a year time trend is the effect of LLC allowances. In the latter model, the LLC allowance variable is positive and significant while it is not in the former. This variable is probably identifying a time effect in the time trend model given the pattern of LLC introductions. 37 A third model is estimated that included a quadratic time trend and the corresponding CIT rate interaction. The coefficients on the quadratic terms are not statistically different from zero in this model, and other results are largely unchanged.
allowances as noted). Here a combined reporting requirement has a positive and statistically significant effect on the CIT base.
Conclusions
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